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To examine the relationship between patient satisfaction and doctor performance, we observed 2,271 
interactions between 292 doctors and their patients in 98 clinics and hospitals in Paraguay and 
conducted an exit-survey with the same patients as they left the clinic. For a sub-sample of 64 
facilities we also tracked down and interviewed patients who visited the facility in the week prior to 
the clinical observation date. There are three patterns in the data: (a) Patient satisfaction is positively 
correlated with doctor effort, measured as a combination of time spent, questions asked and 
examinations performed after controlling for observed doctor and patient characteristics; (b) 
however, accounting for unobserved doctor characteristics dramatically reduces the level of 
significance and size of correlation between effort and satisfaction, showing that much of the positive 
relationship is driven by these unobserved doctor-specific factors and; (c) reported satisfaction is 
significantly lower for patients interviewed at home compared to those interviewed at the clinic. 
Even if patient satisfaction reflects some aspects of the doctor’s performance, unobserved 
heterogeneity combined with survey biases limit the widespread applicability of patient satisfaction as 
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Measures of user-satisfaction are widely used as indicators of public sector performance and a tool 
for improving accountability. They hold a particularly attractive promise for assessing quality in the 
delivery of health care, since health outcomes reflect multiple factors and take a long time to change. 
Clearly, the extent to which measures of user-satisfaction can be used to increase incentives for 
doctors depends on whether they reflect an aspect of performance that doctors can control.  
 
Using data from Paraguay collected by the Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo 
(CIRD) in collaboration with the authors, this paper empirically assesses whether patient satisfaction 
responds to a measurable component of doctor performance that is also likely to improve the quality 
of medical advice. If so, satisfaction could be used as a measure of performance; further, if this is an 
aspect of performance that the doctor can control, incentive payments based on satisfaction 
measures could also lead to improvements in medical care. 
 
The core of the empirical exercise is the simultaneous measurement of doctor performance and 
patient satisfaction. The measure of doctors’ performance, which we call doctor “effort”, is based on 
an easily observable set of actions undertaken by doctors in their interactions with patients. To 
measure effort, interviewers observed doctor-patient interactions and noted, for every interaction, the 
time spent, the questions asked and the examinations performed. These three indicators were 
combined into a single index of effort using principal component analysis. To measure patient 
satisfaction, a second interviewer conducted an exit survey outside the doctor’s office for every 
patient. This exit survey also included questions on patient’s socio-economic background and health 
status.  
 
The results show that patient satisfaction is positively correlated with doctor effort within a 
multivariate regression context. However, the correlation between satisfaction and effort is small to 
begin with, and disappears once provider and patient characteristics are adequately controlled for 
through doctor fixed-effects (more on this below). In contrast, the interview location and/or the 
time since the last interaction with the doctor dramatically alters reported satisfaction, suggesting that 
factors other than a measurable aspect of the doctor’s performance play a large role in the 
determination of patient satisfaction. 
  
There are several reasons for our focus on doctor effort as an indicator of performance. First, higher 
effort leads to better care—recent studies show that doctor effort is strongly correlated with the 
doctor’s medical knowledge and with the quality of medical advice (Das and Hammer 2006, Leonard 
and others 2005). This suggests that effort and competence are complements—if they were 
substitutes so that less competent doctors exert higher effort, the relationship between effort and 
quality of care becomes unclear. Second, as these studies document, the problem is not that doctors 
do not know what to do, it’s that they put in too little effort relative to what they do know. Das and 
Hammer (2006) for instance, show that increases in the quality of care due to a 5-year medical degree 
are completely offset by the difference in effort between the public and private sector in India. Third, 
if doctors are to be rewarded for their performance, the reward has to be based on an aspect of the 
doctors’ practice that s/he can control. Although doctors could acquire training to improve their 
competence, in the short-run, all improvements in the quality of care are likely to arise from higher 
effort in clinical practice. If measures of user-satisfaction are then to be used as quality indicators in 
(say) pay-for-performance schemes, a positive correlation between satisfaction and effort is a 
reasonable minimum requirement. 
 
This paper contributes to a growing literature suggesting that patient satisfaction depends on 
characteristics of the facility, the doctor and the patient, as well as aspects of the interaction between 
the doctor and the patient (Crow et all 2002, Williams, S et all 1998 and Avis et all 1997). Given the 
multiple factors that affect patient satisfaction, there is little consensus about whether satisfaction   3
measures can be used to evaluate the quality of care. For instance, Davies and Ware (1988) conclude 
that “consumers can provide a valid assessment of quality and that bias from personal characteristics is not strong 
enough to invalidate consumers’ ratings”, a finding that contrasts with those of Eriksen (1987) and Chang 
et al. (2006), which do not find support for a strong relationship between the quality of care and 
patient satisfaction.  
 
We differ from previous studies in our methodological approach. Quantitative studies of patient 
satisfaction often examine correlations between reported satisfaction and particular aspects of the 
doctor-patient interaction, with and without the inclusion of patient and doctor characteristics as 
additional covariates. As is well known from the empirical economics literature, these associations 
have limited importance as policy-tools if unobserved patient and doctor characteristics correlated 
both with effort and satisfaction could bias the results. For instance, if more courteous doctors also 
exert greater effort, and patients report higher satisfaction when they are treated courteously, a 
positive correlation between effort and satisfaction would reflect, in part, the positive association 
between courtesy and satisfaction rather than the impact of effort.2 Policy based on such associations 
could lead to results very different from those intended—for instance, bonuses for doctors based on 
reported satisfaction may lead to more courteous behavior without any impact on the quality of 
medical advice. 
 
To address this problem we collected doctor effort and patient satisfaction measures for multiple 
patients for every doctor in the sample. By comparing patient satisfaction for the same doctor when 
s/he exerts greater/less effort in the interaction, unobserved variables at the level of the doctor can 
be accounted for. This technique, known as the “fixed-effect” or “within” specification, has been 
used extensively in the economics literature and, as discussed below, using this methodology 
significantly alters the estimated impact of effort on satisfaction. Indeed, the results argue for a 
“sorting” interpretation whereby patients more likely to report high levels of satisfaction are also 
more likely to visit doctors who exert greater effort; effort in and of itself has no impact on reported 
satisfaction. 
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces the data and the empirical framework. 
Section III presents the results and Section IV discusses the conclusions and caveats. 
 
Section II: Country Context, Data and Empirical Framework 
The Country Context 
Paraguay is a land-locked country in the center of South America with a fast-growing population 
(2.48 percent) of 6.3 million people, of which 52 percent are located in urban areas. Geographically, 
the country is divided into 18 “departments” that also serve as organizing units for health facilities. 
 
Three main institutions provide health services in the country. These are the public sector under the 
Ministry of Health (MoH), the semi-public sector under the Institute of Social Provision (IPS), 
funded through employees and employer contributions, and the fully private sector. The Ministry of 
Health covers 63 percent of the population; the IPS 17 percent and the private sector a further 10 
percent (the remainder is covered by a variety of providers including the police, the army and the 
Paraguayan Red Cross). In contrast to MoH facilities, which can be visited by any individual, both 
the private sector (through higher prices) and the IPS (by treating only those with formal 
employment) are restricted in access. 
 
                                                 
2 Chang et al (2006) report a significant association between communication and satisfaction with no 
relationship between quality and satisfaction. One problem with this study is the sample, which consists 
almost entirely of older patients who may be less able to differentiate the quality of care from interpersonal 
interactions (Cleary et al, 1997).   4
The Ministry of Health follows a “centre-periphery” model. Smaller health posts (called “puestos de 
salud”) provide care for the peripheral (and more rural) populations. The size and complexity of 
facilities increases closer to the center, where health centers (“centro de salud”), district hospitals 
(“hospital districtal”) and central hospitals (“hospital central”) are responsible for medical care. 
Finally, IPS facilities are predominantly in urban areas, where most of the population with regular 
employment lives and are similar to MoH facilities located in the same areas (World Bank 2006). 
 
The Data 
The data are from a survey of 292 doctors in 98 facilities in four departments of the country—
Asuncion, Cordillera, Misiones and Central. These facilities were picked randomly from a list of 
public facilities in these provinces administered by the MoH and the IPS. 
 
There were four different parts to the data collection. In every facility, CIRD completed a facility 
survey and a roster of all doctors. We then observed interactions between doctors and patients for a 
set of doctors randomly chosen from the roster—depending on the size of the facility, the total 
number of doctors observed varied between 1 and 10, yielding a total of 292 doctors who were 
observed at least once.3 For this sample of 292 doctors, there are 11 interactions on average for each 
doctor, yielding a total of 2271 doctor-patient interactions. As the patient left the clinic, a second 
surveyor standing outside completed an exit-interview with detailed socio-demographic information 
on education, wealth, age and employment; health status including self-reported health status and a 
health measure based on activities of daily-living as well as satisfaction with the service.  
 
Finally, we were concerned that observing the doctor-patient interaction would itself change the way 
that the doctor behaved—this is the well-known Hawthorne effect, discussed for instance in Leonard 
(2006). To gauge the extent to which this happened, patients who had visited the facility in the last 
week were surveyed at home and completed a questionnaire similar to that administered in the exit 
survey. This part of the survey was not completed for all the facilities, but for a sub-sample of 64 
facilities administered by the MOH. The households surveyed were predominately within a 15 
minute walk from the facility. Although the patients interviewed through the exit survey are not the 
same as the patients interviewed at home, it is likely that the two samples are comparable: Since we 
chose the day of the facility visit randomly, there is no a priori reason to believe that the patients 
interviewed at home are very different from those interviewed at the facility, once we restrict 
attention to those who came to the clinic from within a 15-minute radius.  
 
Table 1 summarizes basic characteristics of doctors, patients, and reported satisfaction for the full 
sample (Table 1, Column A), the sub-sample of facilities where the additional household survey was 
administered (Table 1, Column B) and for respondents from the household survey itself (Table 1, 
Column C). On average, patients visiting the facilities are in their mid-thirties (parents were 
interviewed when the patient was a child), report at least primary education and just under 20 percent 
report arriving in very good health (SRHS). The doctors who see these patients tend to be female (55 
percent), middle-aged and with an average of 17 years of experience on the job. As in most other 
surveys, patients report a high level of satisfaction: Although the question on satisfaction allowed for 
5 options ranging from “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied”, 90 percent responded that they were 
either “satisfied” or “very satisfied”, a finding that is standard in the literature (Williams, B et all 
1998). For our analysis, we restrict ourselves to two options—“very satisfied” and “others”; for the 
full sample, 59 percent fall in the former category.4 
                                                 
3 A small number of doctors (42) were observed in multiple facilities as part of a study trying to understand 
the impact of contracting regimes on performance. These doctors were over-sampled from the random 
population and their inclusion (or exclusion) does not alter the results.  
4 This categorization does not affect our results; in alternative specifications using 4 possible values for 
satisfaction and an ordinal probit specification, we obtain very similar relationships. Collapsing the 4   5
 
There are few significant differences between the sample of patients in all facilities and in the 
facilities where we also completed the household survey, although there are differences between 
patients interviewed at home and those interviewed through exit surveys at the facility. The former 
tend to live closer to the facility, are older and more likely to be female. These differences are 
partially a result of the distance-restriction implicit in the survey design; the first because we only 
interviewed those who lived close to the facility, and the second because older patients are less likely 
to come from further away. Once we restrict ourselves to patients who come from similar distances, 
the differences between the two samples diminish, but patients interviewed at home are 20 percent 
more likely to be female and there are small but significant differences in the health status, with those 
at home reporting slightly worse health (Appendix Table 1). In sharp contrast to these small 
differences, there is a large and significant drop of 23 percentage points in reported satisfaction in the 
household survey.  
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the observed interactions between doctors and patients. For 
every interaction, information volunteered by the patient (number of days sick and presenting 
symptoms) and the tasks that the doctor completed were noted. The latter included the time spent 
with the patient, the number of questions asked and the number of type of examinations performed. 
In addition, we also noted some aspects of the information that the doctor gave to the patient. These 
characteristics of the interaction—the time spent, the number of questions asked, and the number of 
physical examinations performed—were combined into a single “effort-index” using principal 
components analysis. The effort index is standardized with a mean of zero and a variance of one. On 
average, the effort exerted by the doctors is higher in Paraguay than in lower income countries, and is 
comparable to that observed in European countries (Table 2). Moreover, there are large differences 
in the nature of the interaction between doctors at different levels of the effort index. Doctors in the 
lowest tercile of the index spend around a third time, ask half as many questions, and perform a third 
as many examinations as those in the highest tercile. An increase of one standard-deviation in effort 
corresponds roughly to four extra minutes, three extra questions asked and 0.2 extra examinations 
performed by the doctor. 
 
A second basic characterization of the effort-index and satisfaction variable is a decomposition of the 
total variation in these two variables into variation within and variation across doctors. That is, we ask 
whether most variation in effort and satisfaction is due to differences “across” doctors, so that some 
doctors always put in more effort or “within” doctors so that most doctors put in less effort with 
some patients and more with others. If some doctors consistently put in more effort and others less, 
variation across doctors will account for most of the overall variation in the data. ANOVA (Analysis 
of Variance) decomposition suggests that the variation is roughly equivalent across the two 
categories—58 percent of the variation in effort and 28 percent of the variation in satisfaction is 
across doctors while 42 percent (effort) and 72 percent (satisfaction) is “within” doctors. The 
substantial variation “within” doctors is reassuring and presages a promising empirical strategy—by 
focusing on the variation in effort and satisfaction “within” doctors, we can eliminate potential 
estimation biases arising from systematic variation in effort and satisfaction across doctors. We turn to 
this next. 
                                                                                                                                                 
values into two allows us to present simpler probit specifications that can then be compared to the results 
from the linear probability model. This comparison is useful since in later specifications, we estimate fixed 
effect models only in the linear form.   6
 
Section II.1. Empirical Framework 
 
The Empirical Model  
The empirical framework relates patient satisfaction to the effort exerted by the doctor in the 
interaction. Since most of the variation in satisfaction is between those who report being “very-
satisfied” and those who report being “satisfied”, we retain the binary classification of Table 1 in the 
econometric analysis. There is some evidence that this distinction resonates with patient’s qualitative 
assessment of care and that the difference between the two categories corresponds to a very clear 
distinction in the patient’s feelings about the interaction (Collins and O’Cathian, 2003). The 
dependent variable, Sij, the satisfaction reported by patient i in her interaction with doctor j, is 
therefore coded as: 
 
Sij = 0 if reported satisfaction ≠ “very satisfied” and 
Sij = 1 if reported satisfaction = “very satisfied” 
 
Since the use of fixed-effect estimations leads to substantially different results, two simple tables 
highlight the main contribution of this methodology. Table 3a and 3b show the (hypothetical) effort 
exerted by Doctors A and B in their (hypothetical) interactions with four patients. Doctors can either 
exert high effort (1) or low effort (0.5); likewise patients can report either high satisfaction (1) or low 
satisfaction (0). In our example, Doctor A generically exerts greater effort while Doctor B exerts less.  
 
In Table 3a, there is a strong association between effort and satisfaction across the two doctors but 
there is no association between effort and satisfaction “within” doctors—that is, neither for Doctor A nor for 
Doctor B do patients report more/less satisfaction when each doctor exerts more or less effort. The 
association between effort and satisfaction is driven by the relatively greater use of Doctor B by 
patients who always report low satisfaction and of Doctor A by patients who always report high 
satisfaction. In contrast, Table 3b depicts the situation where there is both a correlation across 
doctors and “within” doctors. In a normal OLS regression both Tables 3a and 3b would show the 
same positive correlation between effort and satisfaction due to the correlation across doctors. A 
fixed-effect specification would reveal that there is no correlation between effort and satisfaction 
within each doctor. 
 
One requirement for “within” doctor estimations of the kind in Table 3b is that there is substantial 
variation in effort for every doctor; indeed, the regression with a “within” doctor estimator, which is 
akin to including a separate dummy variable for every doctor, will not be estimable when every 
doctor exerts the same effort for every patient. In this case, the doctor fixed-effects will be fully 
collinear with effort; fortunately, as we saw above, close to 50 percent of the variation in total effort 
is within rather than across doctors.  
 
The estimation strategy can be presented formally as follows. The multivariate regression framework 
is given by an equation of the form: 
 
Sij = α + βEffortij + γXj + δXi + (ηj + μi + εij)     [Equation 1] 
 
where Effortij is the effort for doctor j in her interaction with patient i, Xj are observed doctor 
characteristics (such as age and gender), Xi  are observed patient characteristics (such as wealth, 
education and health-status) and the terms in the parenthesis (.) are doctor and patient characteristics 
that we did not measure but are correlated with reported satisfaction. The ηj  corresponds to 
unmeasured intrinsic attributes of the doctor (for example courtesy); μi  are unmeasured   7
characteristics of the patient (for example expectations) and εij is an idiosyncratic error associated 
with the interaction.  
 
The estimated impact of effort on satisfaction, β, is biased if unmeasured  characteristics of  doctors, 
such as courtesy, that are correlated with satisfaction are also correlated with effort so that 
cov(ηj,Effortij)  ≠ 0 or if unmeasured  characteristics of patients, such as expectations, that are 
correlated with satisfaction are also correlated with effort (cov(μi,Effortij) ≠ 0).  
 
A fixed-effect specification compares reported satisfaction across patients visiting the same doctor 
and therefore addresses the first concern of unmeasured characteristics of the doctor. Suppose we 
observe two patients visiting the same doctor, so that: 
 
S1j = α + βEffortij + γXj + δX1 + (ηj + μ1 + ε1j)    [Patient  1] 
S2j = α + βEffortij + γXj + δX2 + (ηj + μ2 + ε2j)    [Patient  2] 
 
Subtracting the second equation from the first: 
 
ΔSij = βΔEffortij +δΔXi + (ΔμI + Δεij)     [Equation  2] 
 
Equation 2, (the “fixed-effect” specification) removes bias associated with unobserved doctor 
characteristics that may be correlated both to effort and to reported satisfaction (ηj is eliminated in 
the difference as are all Xj variables. Note that the estimated β is still biased if unmeasured patient 
characteristics that are correlated with satisfaction are also correlated with effort (cov(ΔμI,Effortij) ≠ 
0). This may be the case, for instance, if doctors also put in greater effort for patients who are harder 
to satisfy. We address this concern by including a rich set of patient-level variables; below we also 
discuss results from a potential instrumental variables specification with similar results.5 
 
The second basic empirical relationship we are interested in is the difference in reported satisfaction 
between patients interviewed at home and patients interviewed outside the facility, because of the 
potential Hawthorne effect of observing doctor-patient interactions in the facility. For both sets of 
patients, the data include reported satisfaction and the same set of patient characteristics, but for 
those interviewed at home, there are no measures of the effort-index.6 We thus implement the 
equivalent of Equation 2, comparing those who came to the same facility (thus eliminating facility-
level characteristics) and focusing on the difference between those interviewed at home and those 
interviewed at the facility. 
 
ΔSi = βΔData_Typei +δΔXi + (Δμi + Δεij)    [Equation  3] 
 
The main concern with estimations based on [Equation 3] is that the sample of patients interviewed 
at home may be very different from those interviewed at the clinic. As Table 1 and Appendix Table 1 
show there are some differences in characteristics of patients in the two samples. The econometric 
analysis addresses this by using propensity-score matching techniques to exclude all individuals 
without matching counterparts in both samples and re-estimating Equation 3. That is, we compute 
                                                 
5 Instrumental variables estimators use a variable (the “instrumental variable”) that is correlated to the 
variable of interest (doctor effort), but is uncorrelated with the dependent variable (satisfaction). We argue 
below that one possibility instrument variable is the order in which patients arrive, since doctors exert less 
effort with patients who arrive later in the day. 
6 In the pilot phase of the survey, the recollections of patients interviewed at home were not accurate 
enough to reconstruct the effort-index. That is, patients did not know the time the doctor had spent or the 
number of questions asked, or the number of examinations performed.   8
the likelihood (propensity-score) of being in the household dataset as a function of observed 
individual characteristics, and drop those who look “very different” (in a sense made precise below) 
from the estimation.  
 
Section III: Results 
 
Effort and Satisfaction 
Table 4 presents a series of specifications based on Equations 1 and 2. Columns (1) to (4) present the 
estimations arising from Equation (1), and Columns (5) and (6) present the fixed-effects estimate 
from Equation (2), where unobserved provider characteristics are removed by comparing differences 
across patients for the same doctor. The bivariate correlation between doctor-effort and patient 
satisfaction is highly significant and not affected by the choice of the functional form. In the linear 
(OLS) specification, a one-standard deviation increase in effort leads to a 7 percentage point increase 
in patients reporting that they were very satisfied with the interaction; the point-estimate is virtually 
the same in the non-linear probit specification, which explicitly accounts for the limited dependent 
nature of the satisfaction variable (satisfaction is either 0 or 1) using a normally distributed error 
term.  
 
Column 3 adds in observed patient characteristics as additional controls. The estimated coefficient 
on effort retains both its size and significance. Interestingly, the wealth, health (measured by 5 
questions related to activities of daily living) and education level of the patient are unrelated to 
satisfaction, while age, gender and self reported health status are significant at usual levels of 
confidence. Elder and male patients tend to report higher satisfaction and those who report that their 
health status is excellent are also more satisfied. These correlations agree with a large number of 
studies that find higher satisfaction levels among the elderly and among those in relatively better 
health (Crow et all 2002). 
 
Adding in observed doctor characteristics (Column 4, Table 4) again has no effect on the reported 
effect of effort on satisfaction. The age and experience of the doctor has no independent effect on 
satisfaction, while patients tend to report lower satisfaction for doctors who are male or in urban 
areas. The interaction between the patient’s and the doctor’s gender is highly significant and large 
relative to the impact of effort on satisfaction. Patients in an urban area are 15 percentage points 
more likely to be “very satisfied”; this increase corresponds to a 2.5 standard-deviation increase in the 
doctor’s effort. Finally, there is some indication that patients report higher satisfaction when an index 
of treatment, measuring actions related to doctor-patient communication, is higher. 
 
Columns 5 and 6 are the equivalent to Columns 1, and 4 in a fixed-effect specification (Equation 2). 
There is a large drop in the size and significance of the effect of effort on satisfaction. Once 
unobserved doctor characteristics are accounted for, a one standard-deviation increase in effort leads 
to only a one percentage point increase in the probability of being “very satisfied” with the 
interaction, an increase that is no longer significant. As before, most patient characteristics are 
uncorrelated with satisfaction, although older and patients with excellent self reported health status 
continue to report higher satisfaction levels. Thus, while patient characteristics are associated with 
satisfaction in the same manner as before, there is no longer any observed relationship between 
patient satisfaction and doctor effort, once we compare satisfaction reports by different patients for 
the same doctor. This situation corresponds to the hypothetical example discussed in Table 3a. 
 
Satisfaction at home and at the facility 
Table 5 compares satisfaction reported by patients interviewed at home and those interviewed at the 
facility. Columns 1 and 2 report the bivariate correlation between the data type (home or clinic) and 
satisfaction in OLS and probit specifications; Column 3 introduces the full set of patient controls; 
Column 4 repeats Column 3 in a fixed-effect specification. Columns 5 and 6 “trim” the sample by   9
excluding individuals who do not have common support with the sample of patients observed in the 
facility.7 
 
There are three basic messages. First, the relationship between satisfaction and individual 
characteristics is similar to that in the exit-survey: Most individual characteristics are insignificant but, 
as in Table 4, older patients and those who report excellent health status report higher satisfaction. In 
addition, those who travel farther report lower satisfaction. Second, being interviewed at the clinic 
increases reported satisfaction by 22 to 27 percentage points, a result that is highly significant at the 1 
percent level of confidence and stable across all specifications. Being interviewed at home, in terms 
of satisfaction, is similar to the effect of a doctor putting in 7 standard-deviations less effort in the clinic 
(this is the difference between the doctor spending 1 minute and 30 minutes with the patient). Third, 
there are no significant interaction effects between doctor and patient characteristics, so that the drop 
in satisfaction is similar across all patient and doctor characteristics; it is not the case that richer or 
healthier patients report differential drops in reported satisfaction across the household and exit 
surveys. 
 
Section III.1. Further Results and Some Speculation 
The large differences between the reported satisfaction of patients interviewed at home and those 
interviewed in the clinic raises the possibility that the difference was induced by the nature of the 
study—since we observed doctor-patient interactions for patients interviewed at the clinic, perhaps 
doctors put in higher effort levels than they normally would have. In this case, the difference reflects 
intrinsic differences in doctor’s effort. Leonard’s (2006) discussion of the Hawthorne effect in a 
parallel study in Tanzania points to this possibility; his study also suggests that the Hawthorne effect 
dissipates over time, so that interactions observed later on may be more similar to the “actual” effort 
put in by a doctor when s/he is not being observed.  
  
Figure 1 indicates that patient order is important, suggesting either that doctors get used to the 
observers over time or that (independent of whether they are observed or not), effort naturally 
declines over time. Here, we plot the non-parametric relationship between the doctor’s effort and the 
interaction order, where the 1st interaction we observed is coded as order = 1 and the 20th as order = 
20. Since non-parametric plots are sensitive to the number of observations, we also overlay the total 
number of observations we have for every patient order; the percentages are labeled on the right-
hand axis. 
 
Doctor effort is higher for the first interaction and drops off for later patients, steeply at first and 
gradually later on. A regression of doctor effort on patient order is highly significant in the linear and 
quadratic form, with and without additional patient controls and with and without patient fixed-
effects (Columns 1-3, Table 6). However, the absolute magnitude of the drop-off is too small to 
potentially explain the difference between household and exit surveys. The estimated drop-off from 
the 1st to the 20th patient is around 0.25 standard-deviations in effort, whereas to account for the 22 
percentage point difference requires a difference of 7 standard-deviations or 28 times what is actually 
observed in the data. 
 
Equally troubling is that there is no reported decline in patient satisfaction with the order of the interaction in the 
exit survey (Columns 3-6, Table 6). Thus, although doctor-effort declines significantly with patient-
order, patient-satisfaction itself remains unaffected. Returning to Equation 2, the estimated 
                                                 
7 The trimming is done by first fitting the likelihood of participation in either sample as a function of 
observed patient characteristics using a logistic regression model. Individuals with greater than a 90 percent 
or lower than a 10 percent probability of participation in the household sample (and who therefore do not 
have counterparts in the facility sample) are then excluded from the estimation. These results are not 
sensitive to alternative cutoffs for trimming the sample.   10
coefficient of effort on satisfaction remains biased in the fixed-effect specification if cov(ΔμI,Effortij) 
≠ 0, a possibility that arises, for instance, if doctors put in more effort for patients who are more 
likely to report being “very satisfied”. One way to address such a bias is to look for exogenous 
variation in effort which is unrelated to the characteristics of the patient. If patient-order is indeed 
unrelated to patient characteristics, the true effect of effort on satisfaction would be given by the 
instrumental variables specification, where patient-order is used as an instrument for doctor-effort.8 
The regression estimate of patient-order on satisfaction, which is the “reduced-form” specification or 
the numerator of the instrumental variables estimate, shows that the instrumental variables estimate 
is no different from zero, or that doctor effort has no impact on patient satisfaction. We discuss 
below why this may be too strong a conclusion, but note that this may indeed be a distinct possibility 
for this dataset. 
 
A second explanation for the difference in satisfaction between the household and facility sample 
could be due to systematic differences in the interviewed sample. One possibility is that those 
interviewed at home were more likely to be the patients who did not benefit from the treatment 
given in the previous week (and were therefore at home when we visited them). There is an 
indication that this could be part of the explanation, since reported health status is lower among the 
household sample, even after controlling for distance from the facility. However, this difference in 
the health status is very small (to the order of 0.03 standard deviations) and there is no change in the 
estimated impact on satisfaction of interview location with or without health-status variables in the 
regression. If biases arising from sample selection are then ruled out, it must be either that 
satisfaction decreases as we move further from the date of the interaction or individuals report lower 
levels of satisfaction at home than at the clinic. The literature reports both sorts of results, although 
there are also studies that have emerged at the opposite conclusion (Crow et. all 2002; Jackson et. all 
2003). 
 
Section IV: Conclusion, Caveats and a Brief Discussion 
The main aim of this project was to ascertain whether patient satisfaction responded to a measure of 
doctor performance that can be altered in the short-run. If so, satisfaction can be used to provide 
incentives and/or increase the accountability of service providers. Our primary contribution is the 
simultaneous measurement of doctor effort and patient satisfaction and the use of standard empirical 
economic tools in large samples to address concerns arising from unobserved heterogeneity in 
doctor-patient interactions.  
 
We feel that these tools add to our understanding of the determinants of patient satisfaction. For 
instance, a naïve positive correlation between doctor effort (using consultation time) and patient 
satisfaction has been reported in a number of studies. The significant drop in the estimated impact of 
effort on satisfaction once doctor fixed-effects are included suggests that much of this relationship is 
driven by unobserved doctor characteristics.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that satisfaction is poorly correlated to doctor performance and in ways 
that are hard to fix. Several results point us to this negative conclusion. The estimated effect of 
doctor-effort on satisfaction is small compared to other observable characteristics of patients and 
doctors. The location of the facility, the age of the patient and the self reported health status and 
whether s/he saw a doctor of the same gender are all significantly associated with satisfaction, and 
are large relative to the impact of effort. Some of these are (somewhat) under the control of the 
doctor: If satisfaction is to be used as a measure of performance, ensuring that male patients see male 
doctors will increase satisfaction more than doubling the time and effort spent with the patient; 
whether matching doctor-patient genders has as large an effect on the quality of care is debatable. 
 
                                                 
8 We thank Ken Leonard for this suggestion.   11
If observable characteristics alone determined satisfaction, “adjusted” satisfaction measures that 
present the level of satisfaction after accounting for differences in these characteristics would be a 
reliable measure. This is the equivalent, for instance, to “value-added” measures in school-
performance cards that present student test-scores after adjusting for student background and school 
characteristics. The results suggest however, that unobserved rather than observed characteristics are 
important. There is a large and significant decline in the estimated impact of effort on satisfaction in 
fixed-effect specifications where unobserved doctor characteristics are adequately accounted for.  
 
Furthermore, although we cannot fully account for unobserved patient characteristics, the reduced-
form of the instrumental variables specification suggests that the lack of an association between 
satisfaction and doctor effort is robust to unobserved patient characteristics. We are somewhat 
reluctant to argue for this strong conclusion, since we do not know whether order itself is related to 
patient characteristics, or has an independent effect on satisfaction (for instance, if patients later in 
the order also waited more, this could affect their satisfaction level). However, in combination with 
the fixed-effects results, this suggests that satisfaction level is severely contaminated by the systematic 
matching of patients to doctors and in ways that are unobserved by the researcher. 
 
Finally, the differences in satisfaction reported by a comparable sample of patients interviewed at 
home compared to those interviewed in the clinic are an order of magnitude higher than between 
doctors who put in more/less effort. Hawthorne effects are unlikely to explain these differences; it is 
likely that other behavioral survey issues such as the “warm-glow” of being interviewed shortly after 
the interaction or the comfort of being interviewed at home rather than in the setting of the clinic are 
at play. In either case, there is a strong case for exercising caution in interpreting satisfaction results 
either over time or across settings when survey conditions were not identical. 
 
There are a number of caveats and potential modifications. In the household interview we did not 
record the date of the facility-visit, although we ensured that the visit to the facility was during the 
week previous to our visit. We therefore cannot ascertain the degree to which satisfaction drops-off 
with time. As discussed previously, unobserved patient characteristics could bias our results; the 
instrumental variables discussion suggests that the estimate in the fixed-effect specification may be 
too high. Finally, by design our interviews were highly structured. While this does afford us the 
luxury of a large sample and the use of econometric tools with some precision, a component of the 
survey that allowed for unstructured interviews and more qualitative information could have added 
to our understanding of the environment.   12
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Figures and Tables 
 











 (1– 2) 
Difference and p-
value  
(2 – 3) 
          Patient Characteristics         
Asset index  0.03 (0.92)  -0.11 (0.87)  -0.13 (0.92)   0.15 (0.00)  -0.01 (0.77) 
Health index  0.01 (0.98)  0.01 (0.99)  -0.04 (0.87)  0.00 (0.95)  -0.05 (0.28) 
Distance to facility in minutes  31.41 (42.94)  23.25 (26.34)  9.29 (7.82)   8.20 (0.00)  -13.96 (0.00) 
Age of patient
1  35.25 (14.98)  33.48 ( 14.35)  38.65 (15.83)   1.77 (0.00)  5.17 (0.00) 
Patient is Male  0.34 (0.47)  0.34 (0.47)  0.13 (0.33)  -0.01 (0.76)  -0.21 (0.00) 
Primary education or higher 
dummy 
0.82 (0.39)  0.79 (0.41)  0.75 (0.43)  0.03 (0.04)  -0.03 (0.11) 
Household size  5.33 (2.36)  5.49 (2.41)  5.08 (2.15)  -0.16 (0.06)  -0.41 (0.00) 
Excellent self reported health 
status dummy 
0.19 (0.39)  0.18 (0.38)  0.13 (0.34)     0.01 (0.40)  -0.05 (0.01) 
          Doctor Characteristics          
Doctor is male  0.45 (0.50)  0.45 (0.50)    0.01 (0.64)   
Experience in years  17.29 (7.61)  16.54 (7.61)    0.75 (0.01)   
Age of Doctor  43.79 (8.33)  43.35 (8.50)    0.45 (0.14)   
          Measure of effort and satisfaction        
Number of examinations by 
doctor  
2.73 (1.96)  3.19 (1.92)    -0.46 (0.00)   
Number of questions asked by 
doctor 
8.02 (5.26)  8.17 (5.28)    -0.15 (0.43)   
Time spent in interaction  8.01 (4.81)  8.16 (5.17)    -0.15 (0.40)   
Standardized index of doctor 
effort 
0.00 (1.00)  0.11 (1.02)    -0.11 (0.00)   
Satisfaction dummy  0.59 (0.49)  0.57 (0.50)  0.35 (0.48)  -0.02 (0.27)  -0.22 (0.00) 
          
Observations   2271  1190  582     
Notes: Standard errors in (parentheses). Column (1) uses the entire sample, Column (2) only those facilities from where patients were also interviewed at 
home. Column (3) presents the attributes of patients interviewed at home; for these patients, we do not know the characteristics of the doctors who they 
interacted with. The index of physicians’ effort is a composite index of time spent with patients, number of examinations and total number of questions asked. 
The effort index is normalized to be mean 0 and variance 1. The asset index is based on the family’s access to water, sanitation at home and ownership of 16 
durable assets. The health index is a composite index based on 5 questions related to Activities of Daily Living (ADL) where the patients were asked about 
their ability to lift heavy objects, carry bags home from the market, take the stairs, kneel down, and walk one kilometer. 1) For patients younger than 15 we 
record the age of the parent, while for patients older than 15 the age of patient.  
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Physicians in first tercile of  
effort index  -0.95 4.55 4.87 1.42 1.32 
Physicians in second tercile of  
effort index  -0.14 7.17 7.24 2.96 1.52 
Physicians in third tercile of  
effort index 
1.09 12.31  11.97 3.81  1.79 
All Physicians  0.00 8.01 8.02 2.73 1.54 
International comparison       
Delhi
a1   3.80  3.20  N.A  2.63 
Tanzania
2 (2003)    6.95  3.57  N.A  N.A 
Tanzania
3 (1991)    3.0  N.A  N.A  2.2 
Nigeria
3   6.3  N.A  N.A  2.8 
Malawi
3   2.3  N.A  N.A  1.8 
Germany
4   7.6  (4.3)  N.A  N.A  N.A 
United Kingdom
4   9.4  N.A  N.A  N.A 
1Das and Hammer (2005). 
2: Ken Leonard, Private Communication 
3: Hogelzeil et al (1993) 
4: Deveugele M et al (2002)
 5 Total 
number of medicines given. Cells where no data is available are labeled N.A. (Not Available). 
 
   15
 
 
Table 3a – Positive Association between Effort and Satisfaction Across Doctors - Not Within Doctors  
  Doctor A  Doctor B 
 Effort  Satisfaction  Effort  Satisfaction 
Patient 1  1.0  1  0.5  0 
Patient 2  1.0  1  0.5  0 
Patient 3  1.0  1  0.5  0 
Patient 4  0.5  1  1.0  0 
 
  Table 3b – Positive Association between Effort and Satisfaction Across and Within Doctors  
  Doctor A  Doctor B 
 Effort  Satisfaction  Effort  Satisfaction 
Patient 1  1.0  1  0.5  0 
Patient 2  1.0  1  0.5  0 
Patient 3  1.0  1  0.5  0 
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Dependent Variable  Patient Satisfaction  
          Physicians & Patients          












Treatment index        0.078 
[5.30]a    0.024 
[1.20] 
Interaction male dummies         0.136 
[2.79]a    
          Patients           
Asset index      0.003 
[0.24] 
0.009 
[0.72]    0.01 
[0.82] 
Age of interviewed      0.006 
[1.89]c 
0.007 
[2.09]b    0.009 
[2.83]a 
Patient is Male      0.046 
[1.79]c 
-0.004 
[0.12]    0.046 
[1.83]c 
Distance to facility in 
minutes     0.00 
[0.29] 
0.00 
[0.13]    0.00 
[0.17] 
Squared distance to facility 
in minutes     0.00 
[1.79]c 
0.00 
[1.45]    0.00 
[1.00] 
Excellent self reported 
health dummy     0.235 
[8.49]a 
0.224 
[8.40]a    0.151 
[5.21]a 
Primary education or 
higher dummy     -0.02 
[0.67] 
-0.024 
[0.82]    -0.025 
[0.81] 
Health index      0.001 
[0.11] 
-0.001 
[0.10]    0.017 
[1.35] 
          Physicians & Facilities          
Doctor is Male        -0.061 
[1.81]c    
Age of doctors        0.002 
[0.65]    
Urban Facility        0.144 
[2.27]b    
IPS Administered Facility        -0.05 
[0.85]    
Constant  0.588 








Observations 2271  2271  2172  2111  2271  2172 
R-squared 0.02    0.08  0.1  0.00  0.05 
Number of physicians fixed effects      292  291 
Notes: a,b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of confidence respectively. Reported coefficients in Probit 
regressions are marginal effects calculated at the mean of the sample and robust t statistics are presented in parenthesis. Additional 
controls include 8 dummies for presenting symptoms, an indicator for consultations paid for by a third party, household size and 
age-squared. The doctor’s experience and whether the doctor holds a specialization are also controlled for. The index of physicians’ 
effort is a composite index of time spent with patients, number of examinations and total number of questions asked normalized to 
be mean 0 and variance 1. The treatment index is a composite index for 5 actions taken. The actions recorded were; advised 
additional examinations, treated patient during consultation, wrote documents, gave verbal instructions and arranged follow up 
consultation. The interaction variable for male dummies is a dummy for a male patient seeing a male doctor. The asset index is 
based on the family’s access to water, sanitation at home and ownership of 16 durable assets. The health index is a composite index 
based on 5 questions related to Activities of Daily Living (ADL) where the patients were asked about their ability to lift heavy 
objects carry bags home from the market, take the stairs, kneel down, and walk one kilometer. IPS is a semi-public sector health 
provider funded through employees and employer contributions.   17
 
 























Dependent Variable   Patient Satisfaction 












Interaction between sample 








Interaction between sample 
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Squared distance to facility in 








Excellent self reported health 








Third party paid for 








Primary or higher education 
















Constant  0.347 








Observations  1772 1772 1689 1689 1227 1227 
R-squared  0.04    0.1  0.09 0.13 0.12 
Number of facilities fixed effect     64  64 
Notes: a,b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of confidence respectively. Reported coefficients in Probit regressions 
are marginal effects calculated at the mean of the sample and robust t statistics are presented in parenthesis. The asset index is based 
on the family’s access to water, sanitation at home and ownership of 16 different assets. The health index is a composite index based 
on 5 questions related to Activities of Daily Living (ADL) where the patients were asked about their ability to lift heavy objects, carry 
bags home from the market, take the stairs, kneel down, and walk one kilometer. In Column (6) observations are restricted to matched 
observations defined as those with a likelihood of inclusion in the household survey between 0.1 and 0.9. This excludes the 
observations that are most unlikely to have a matching observation in the data based on patient characteristics.   
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Figure 1 - Doctor Effort Decreases with Patient-Order 
 
The non-parametric curve showing the relationship between doctors effort and order of patients is a smoothed value given 
by a local weighted linear least squares regression. This allows us to show the relationship between doctor effort and patient 
order without assuming a particular functional form. Since this non-parametric plot is sensitive to the number of 
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Dependent Variable  Doctor Effort Patient  Satisfaction 
























Asset index    -0.063 
[2.27]b 
-0.029 




Age of interviewed    0.001 
[0.11] 
0.003 




Age of interviewed squared    0.00 
[0.16] 
0.00 




Male dummy    -0.075 
[1.27] 
-0.011 




Primary or higher education dummy    -0.024 
[0.31] 
0.004 




Distance to facility in minutes    0.00 
[0.34] 
0.00 




Squared distance to facility in 
minutes    0.00 
[0.16] 
0.00 




Excellent self reported health 
dummy    0.046 
[0.72] 
-0.038 




Health index    0.028 
[1.04] 
0.033 




Somebody ells paid for consultation 
dummy    -0.295 
[2.80]a 
-0.022 




Referred patient    -0.057 
[0.54] 
0.086 
















Observations 2271  2172  2172  2271  2172  2172 
R-squared 0.01  0.07  0.05 0.00 0.06  0.05 
Number of doctor fixed effects      291      291 
Notes: a,b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of confidence respectively and robust t statistics are presented in parenthesis. The 
index of physicians’ effort is a composite index of time spent with patients, number of examinations and total number of questions asked. The 
effort index is normalized. The health index is a composite index based on 5 questions related to Activities of Daily Living (ADL) where the 
patients were asked about their ability to lift heavy objects, carry bags home from the market, take the stairs, kneel down, and walk one kilometer. 
The asset index is based on the family’s access to water, sanitation at home and ownership of 16 different assets. 





















Dependent Variable  Indicator Variable for whether the patient was observed in the 
facility 






























































































Observations  1712 1712 1689 1689 1689 
R-squared   0.09  0.20  0.16 
Number  of  facilities       64 
Notes: This table compares the attributes of patients observed in the facility and those who had visited the facility in the 
week prior to the observation (and were therefore interviewed at home). a,b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels of confidence respectively. Reported coefficients in Probit regressions are marginal effects calculated at the 
mean of the sample and robust t statistics are presented in parenthesis. The health index is a composite index based on 
5 questions related to Activities of Daily Living (ADL) where the patients were asked about their ability to lift heavy 
objects, carry bags home from the market, take the stairs, kneel down, and walk one kilometer. The asset index is based 
on the family’s access to water, sanitation at home and ownership of 16 different assets. 
 
 
 
 